Section One: Legislative Professionalism in Context INTRODUCTION:
To even the most armature observer of American politics one dichotomy will seem very familiar: Democrats believe the government to be a positive force for good while Republicans are adamant in their constant skepticism of the ability of government to accomplish much of anything. "Too much government," "too many regulations," and "too many taxes" are phrases all common in Republican speeches, campaigns, and policy proposals. The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which ideology and partisanship can be utilized to explain legislative professionalism. Most scholars remain focused on economic factors that influence professionalization. While these factors remain important, it is my assertion that ideological influences cannot be completely dismissed and need to be examined further. To demonstrate this point, I will first provide an over of the professionalization movement as well as cover some of the major scholarship that has been produced on this topic over the past forty years. Following that I will explicate the results of survey research I conducted of Oregon legislators. Lastly the survey findings are compared with previous scholarship to see the extent to which they comport with previous conducted research in this area. This study concludes that under some circumstances legislator ideology can have an impact over a State's propensity to professionalize, however, that effect is often limited by the comparative wealth (GDP), of each state.
LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM
In 1960s, the Citizens Conference of State Legislatures (CCSL), published a book entitled The Sometime Governments, in which state legislatures were evaluated for how "functional, accountable, informed, independent and representative" 3 they were and ranked accordingly from one to fifty. The rankings served as a "wakeup call" for many state lawmakers, as "no state wanted to remain ranked in the bottom half of the list or below its neighbors or rivals." 4 Due in part to the CCSL, the mid-1960s through the 1980s saw a reform movement 2 " Legislators' Occupations in all States, 1976 States, , 1986 States, , 1993 States, , 1995 States, , 2007 ," NCLS website. http://www.ncsl.org/legislatureselections/legisdata/legislator-occupations-national-data.aspx (fix) 3 Outlined in more detail in Appendix A 4 "The Sometime Governments Revisited," NCLS website. http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2010/07/the-sometime-governmentsrevisited.html "sweep through the nation, with state after state moving to professionalize its legislature." The original report on legislative professionalism published by the CCSL created their
own criteria of what a professional legislature should look like, and measured each state's legislature against that standard. These criteria, as previously outlined, were as follows: that a legislature ought to be "Functional, Accountable, Informed, Independent, and Representative."
However, a set of recommendations also accompanied the criteria (Appendix A). To a modern reader familiar with Congress, these recommendations may seem commonplace. For example "adequate office facilities" for legislatures is something every citizen would expect their legislators to have access to. This was not in the case in most state legislators of the 1960s.
Former Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski remembers serving in the Oregon legislature in the early 1970's and how few resources were available to the legislature in those days. "When I first started in the legislature, (legislators) didn't have (their) own offices," Kulongoski recalls, "the capitol expansion in the late 1970's finally changed that." 7 The Governor's statement refers to the 12.5 million dollar renovation in 1977 which "added further space for legislative offices, hearing rooms, support services, a first floor galleria, and underground parking. Fictional California became more "functional" than Texas in regard to staffing yet less "functional" with shorter session lengths. In this hypothetical scenario which legislature is to be considered more "professionalized"? Scholars agreed that the best way to solve this problem was to use Congress as the standard of a professionalized legislature with which compare the relative level of professionalization of each state legislature. A standard definition of professionalism emerged.
Professionalism Defined
The commonly accepted general definition of "professionalism" is the movement of state Woods, 589. only indirect influence on individual legislators and have more to do with the function of the legislature as a whole. The increases in length of sessions, for example, allowed the legislature more time to adequately consider and craft legislation on larger and more complex issues.
Expanded facilities for office space not only provided members with a workplace but gave them the opportunity to hire additional staff. Increased levels of non-partisan staff, lawyers to help draft legislation, economists and accountants to help forecast revenues and expenditures, and also committee staff, assist the legislature by providing internal sources of information as well as streamlining the legislative process. The advent of partisan staff also helped to support the legislature. As with all non-partisan staff, they work to keep their legislator informed and can bring expert knowledge the legislators may not otherwise have access to. With the demands of policy making, legislators do not have sufficient time to answer the hundreds of emails and phone calls they get on a weekly basis. While some of this work can be mundane, partisan staff play a valuable role in creating awareness around what issues are of concern to constituents as well as forging a relationship between the legislator and his/her constituents. Even in amateur or semi-professional legislatures legislators have realized that having a limited number full time staff in the office year round helps to compensate for members only being there part time. 20 In addition to Institutional aspects of professionalism, Rosenthal also identified characteristics that could be categorized as Careerist Professionalism, or "Careerism."
Careerist Professionalism
Careerism is the extent to which members consider being a legislator as their full time decisions to make, more constituents issues to deal with, and a greater diversity of interests to balance; therefore, they receive a larger salary and have instituted more professional mechanisms to deal with the workload.
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 GDP only slightly higher than Hawaii, received one of the lowest Squire Index scores given.
Despite the fact that many scholars accept the GDP of states as one of the largest indicators, it alone cannot adequately explain the discrepancy between states. Partisanship has emerged as a potential explanation for this discrepancy.
Partisanship
The explanation from partisanship is based on the assumption that Democrats are, in general, more supportive of an expansion of the role of Government, whereas Republicans generally opposed these policies. Fiorina (1994) 309 saw a very modest .7 percent increase in their seat share across the thirty-one state sample.
However, it would be ridiculous to expect that a change in legislative session length or compensation would have an exponential net benefit for democrats. A re-examination of the Squire Index data with consideration given to the political composition of each state legislature will shed further light on the influence of partisanship on professionalism.
Section Two: Research Methods and Results

METHODOLOGY
In order to establish a link between political ideology and professionalization, a survey of Oregon state legislature was conducted. The data presented in this paper sheds light onto the perceptions of legislators as to what they think of Professionalism as it pertains to their ideological views and party affiliation. Secondary outcomes will explore how legislators view session length and allocation of resources toward their own salaries, office staff, and legislative resources. This will establish a potential relationship between party affiliation and/or ideology and the tendency to move toward a more a professionalized legislature. Some social scientists deride case studies as the weakest form of inquiry, particularly when the scope is limited to a single or a few cases. These critics argue that with such a small data set, it is impossible to extrapolate any larger theory from such a limited sample. However, that critique is only valid where cases lack fairly uniform background conditions. In the study of state legislatures, a substantial number of similarities exist between states such that comparison is possible. In this regard Oregon is relevant not only because the history of the professionalization of Oregon's legislature is common to that of other states, but also because it has such a diverse economy and political landscape. Moreover, the work of Robert Yin has demonstrated the case study to be extremely useful as a method of testing theoretical frameworks.
Oregon As Case Study
The modern Oregon economy has strong agricultural and natural resource extraction base in the rural areas as well as a vibrant technology and industry sector in the metropolitan hub of The history of the professionalization of Oregon's legislature is similar to that of many other states. Oregon's most major effort to modernize its legislature was in 1967, a time when dozens of other states were also looking at reform. During that time the legislature "created an advisory committee to study and recommend reforms" and in 1968, the committee's report was 44 Clucas, (2005) issued and the state legislature chose to adopt some, but not all of the recommended reforms. Hedge (1998), 116 One final general justification for the use of case study research is grounded in the work of Robert Yin (1981 
Survey Construction, Distribution, and Return Rate
It was my hypothesis that when ideological factors are compared with responses from issues such as session length or legislator salaries a trend would emerge. In constructing the survey, I first asked legislators to identify their political party and ideological affiliation, as well as whether their district was "urban," "rural," or a "mixture" of the two. Questions were then formulated to ascertain legislator perceptions regarding the switch to annual sessions, current legislator salary and staffing levels. The answers to these questions would be compared with the partisan identification of the participant. (For a complete view of the survey, see Appendix D).
Surveys were physically distributed with a pre-addressed envelope to member offices at the state capitol building in Salem. Included with the survey was a one page informational 53 that informed the members of the purpose of the survey as well as the assurance that their responses would be anonymous. An attempt was made to distribute over ninety surveys, one to every legislator; however, three offices declined to participate in the survey and I could not distribute two due to a lack of staff present in the office. In the following weeks, I received twenty-nine responses to the survey leaving a return rate of 34 percent. Of the responses received, nineteen were from Democratic legislators while only ten were from Republicans. Considering the Democrats currently hold majorities in both houses this is not totally unexpected. This leaves a partisan participation at a rate of twenty out of fifty, (40 percent), for democrats and nine out of forty, (22.5 percent), for Republicans. Republicans were represented at a slightly lower percentage than democrats, however such return rates are not outside of the norm for survey research and adequate for the purposes of my analysis.
SURVEY RESULTS
Ideology vs. Annual Sessions
As already mentioned, nineteen out of the twenty-nine survey participants identified as Democrats while ten identified as Republicans. Having collected data from a solid representation of ideological positions, those positions can now be compared with the rest of the survey data.
[ Table Two about [ Table Three about 
Ideology vs Staffing Levels
Previous calculations of legislature staffing levels have focused only on the total staff employee by the legislature and then divides that by number of legislators in a given state. This all-encompassing number includes both the partisan staff employed by legislative offices as well as non-partisan committee, fiscal and budget, and legal staff. Legislators utilize non-partisan staff for writing bills and parsing the fiscal and budgetary outcomes of legislation, yet have little direct control over their management. In parsing the effect partisanship has on the professionalization process, I therefore was largely uninterested in nonpartisan staff and was more directly concerned with how legislators staffed their own offices. When looking at the level of partisan staff each member employs annually a slight differentiation between urban liberal Democrats and rural conservative Republicans in Oregon emerges.
[ Regardless of party affiliation most every member of the Oregon legislature hires one full-time partisan staff member. The major split between the parties is over part-time staff vs. shared staff.
A near unanimous majority of Democrats admitted to hiring at least one part-time staff member, presumably for when they legislature is in session and workloads are increased. Just over fifty percent of republicans also hire part-time staff, yet four out of nine also conceded to sharing staff between other member offices. Based on the data, is does appear the Democrats are slightly more inclined to staff their offices at slightly higher levels. Another explanation could be that
Republicans employ a smaller pool of people than Democrats and share them between their offices. Effectively this would make a "shared" staff member full time in terms of the number of hours work per week. These "shared" full time staffers would then split their work between offices as needed. Such a phenomena is not absent from Democratic members. The data merely suggests it is much more common among Republicans. Another way to look at the Table 5 data is to assign numerical values for each type of staff member employed annually.
To make the comparison of [ Table Six about here] This data more clearly supports the assertion that Democrats staff their offices as slightly higher levels than do their Republican counterparts. Moreover, liberals and those in urban areas are also more likely to have incrementally larger staff than conservatives or members from rural districts. Considering not only staffing levels but also session length and legislative salary, the survey data gathered from Oregon legislators strongly indicates a relationship between partisanship and levels of professionalization. Having established tentative connections between partisanship and three main factors which contribute to the Squire Index. However, political party and ideology proved not to be explanatory factors when it comes to legislator preferences surrounding the issue of employee staff over the long term vs. hiring new staff every few years.
Section Three: Data Analysis
A tentative relationship has been established between ideology and the main three ingredients of the Squire Index. I now turn back to Squire to see if the implications of this study can shed any light on explaining the outliers created by Squire's measurement. If ideology has a measurable impact on formation on legislator salary, session length, and staffing Squire's index 55 Less than 30 hours per week should reflect that with historically conservative, republican dominated states receiving lower scores than their historically liberal, democratic counterparts. Additionally Fiorina was not wrong to assert that such a relationship exists, he was just mistaken to assume that the effects professionalization would have exponential impact on partisanship over time.
Ideology and Squire
State GDP remains be the most consistent indicator of professionalization, however, the preliminary results of this study indicate large variations between states with similar GDPs may, in fact, be the result of the partisan differences between those states. Squire is strongly of the opinion of the opinion that State Wealth is the best explanatory factory in explaining State
Professionalism. The data collected through my research has not disproven that theory. My assertion is that the GDP model is largely incomplete without accounting for the ideological preferences. Figure Republicans may support some measures of Professionalization, but only to a certain point.
One major weakness of figure one is that it fails to take into account ideological differences between the States. Democrats in the south are known to be much more conservative than their northern or western counterparts. The same analysis used with figure four can be conducted using party ideology rankings 59 for each state.
[ Figure 
Implications of Ideology:
Fiorina's article pointed out that while individual events in professionalization may have created positive outcomes from Democrats, those trends produced little to no gain over time. to say liberal democrats were huge beneficiaries of this change. This has led some scholars 64 to these court cases as the birth of legislative professionalism. If it can be said that legislative professionalism was born out of ideology, then it illogical to assume that ideology does not hold some weight in influencing relative levels of professionalization in various states.
Study Limitations and Future Directions
Case studies will always have the problem of not being more broadly applicable, despite the similarities between the subject and other related cases. I will continue to defend the assertion Oregon makes a solid case worth studying. The aforementioned work of Yin, (1984) , also lends validity to this study. The recent switch to annual sessions is something most states had accomplished, at least some extent, thirty years prior. Moving forward further survey data should be gathered comparing the ideological preferences of state legislators with the choices they make when it comes to staffing, salary increases, and other reforms in professionalization.
As ideology varies within political parties across the country, the political party affiliation should not be expected to be very predictive of professionalization levels. Ideology, at least in the case of Oregon, proved to be extremely effective in explaining the switch to annual sessions.
However, before any major conclusions may be drawn outside of Oregon, further research is needed examining this trend.
One possible line of inquiry could take the form of a comparative study between states with similar GDP yet fairly different professionalization scores. 
Appendix C
Thank you for choosing to participate in this survey. By participating, you agree to have your answers complied and published in the form of survey data. Individual answers will not be published or made public.
Background Information:
In the 1950s state legislatures looked amateurish in comparison to Congress -legislators on the state level were understaffed, underpaid, and only were in session a few months per year. Political Scientist Alexander Heard described the state legislature of the mid-twentieth century as institutionally "poorly organized; technically ill-equipped; functioning with inadequate time, staff, and space; and operating with outmoded procedures and committee systems" 66 However, over the past fifty years, a reform movement to transform state legislatures into a more Congress-like body occurred. Scholars have labeled this movement the process of "professionalization."
Legislative professionalism can be generally defined as the movement of State Legislatures to the same level of organizational support as Congress. This means "providing State Legislatures with adequate resources to do their jobs in a manner comparable to Congress" Adequate resources include, but are not limited to, "expanded legislative sessions, superior staff resources, and sufficient pay to allow members to peruse legislative service as their vocation."
Professionalization in Oregon:
The history of the professionalization of Oregon's legislature is similar to that of many other states. Oregon's most major effort to modernize its legislature was in 1967, when the legislature "created an advisory committee to study and recommend reforms." In 1968, the committee's report was issued and the state legislature chose to adopt some, but not all of the recommended reforms. Following national trends, initial reforms included "increased legislators' pay, removed constitutional restrictions on session lengths, and hired more staff." The expanded session length and additional staff was meant to increase institutional professionalism by giving legislators the professional support they needed to do their jobs. The increase in salary worked to make the position of "legislator" more financially viable as permanent vocation. Further reforms came in the late 1970's and early 1980's, when a 12.5 million dollar renovation of the Oregon Capitol building "added further space for legislative offices, hearing rooms, support services, a first floor galleria, and underground parking." 67 Additionally resources were made available for full time staff to assist legislators in their duties. This phenomenon in Oregon did not stop with the changes of the 60's, 70's and 80's. It remains an ongoing process in all fifty states today.
Purpose of this Survey:
The main function is to ascertain how legislators and their staff perceive the changes that have taken place in the Oregon State Legislature over the past 50 years. As legislatures continue to modernize their institutions and behavior, it continues to be important to research and track these changes. Thank you for choosing to participate in this survey. Again, your answers will be kept anonymous. The results of my research will be published this summer and available online. It is my hope that it will provide useful insight into the "state of the legislature," and my findings will serve to highlight ways in which the legislature can better serve the citizens of the State of Oregon.
